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Measuring Share Price Accuracy
Merritt B. Fox*
This Article concerns how to measure share price accuracy. It is prompted
by the fact that many scholars believe that the prices established in the stock
market affect the efficiency of the real economy.1 In their view, more accurate
prices increase the amount of value added by capital-utilizing enterprises as
these enterprises use society's scarce resources for the production of goods and
services. More accurate share prices help improve both the quality of choice
among new proposed investment projects in the economy and the operation of
existing real assets currently in corporate hands.2
The proposition that more accurate share prices improve the efficiency of
the real economy implies that promoting share price accuracy is a worthy goal
of public policy. It would therefore be helpful to be able to measure whether
the policies adopted in fact accomplish this aim. A wide variety of policy
*
Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. A substantial portion of this
Article is based on a discussion written by me in a significantly larger piece, Merritt B. Fox, Randall
Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The
New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 3 (2003).
1. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751 (1984); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2533-39 (1997) [hereinafter
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market]; Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015-25 (1984); Marcel
Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul
G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Ct. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
There are dissenters from this position, however. See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE 135-39 (1979); Adolph A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 433, 445-47 (1962); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 645-47 (1988).
Nonetheless, this debate is outside the scope of this Article, which starts with the assumption that more
accurate prices improve the efficiency of the real economy.
2. Improved price accuracy in the primary market for shares produces these social benefits directlyGreater share price accuracy at a time when an issuer contemplates implementing a new project by
means of a new share offering will bring the issuer's cost of capital more in line with the social cost of
investing society's scarce savings in the contemplated project. As a result, these savings are allocated
more efficiently, going more to the most promising proposed projects in the economy. Improved price
accuracy in the secondary market creates social benefits as well, though less directly. More accurate
secondary market share prices enhance the effectiveness of the social devices that limit the extent to
which managers of public corporations place their own interests above those of their shareholders (the
agency costs of management). By signaling when there are problems, more accurate prices assist in both
the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise and shareholder enforcement of management's
fiduciary duties. They also increase the threat of hostile takeover when managers engage in non-sharevalue-maximizing behavior, not only by pointing out when incumbent management is failing but also by
reducing the chance that a value-enhancing acquisition will be deterred by the target having an
inaccurately high share price.

Berkeley Business Law Journal

Vol. 1:113, 2004

measures are implicated here. Does issuer disclosure increase share price
accuracy? What is the effect of various restrictions on insider trading and
tipping? What is the effect of selective disclosure by issuers to institutional
investors or analysts? Should analysts be regulated in some fashion? All of
these questions are subjects of unresolved theoretical debates. Good empirical
input could be of great value.
Developing a practical measure of share price accuracy, however, is tricky.
As will be discussed below, a share price is more accurate if it is a better
predictor of a firm's dividends and other distributions to its shareholders over
the rest of the life of the firm. How well a firm's share price scores in this
regard cannot be determined definitively until the firm's life ends and it
liquidates. To be useful for policy making, a measure of share price accuracy
must be able to be made earlier, while firms are still operating. Thus, scholars
have looked for proxies for the definitive measure that can only be made after
liquidation.
Traditionally share price variance over time has been used as such a proxy.3
A smaller variance has been interpreted as suggesting a more accurate price.
More recently, some scholars have adopted a different measure, called R 2,
which reflects the extent to which a firm's share price moves with the prices of
all the other firms in the economy. 4 A lower R2, meaning less co-movement, is
taken by these scholars to mean a more accurate price. I will argue here,
through a combination of theoretical and empirical analyses, that R2 is in fact a
better proxy for share price accuracy than share price variance.
I. SHARE PRICE ACCURACY

The first step in considering how best to measure share price accuracy is to
discuss with greater precision exactly what it means to say that prices are more
accurate. The concept of share price accuracy used here relates to how good a
share's price is as a predictor of the future cash flows (dividends and any other
distributions) that will be received by whoever holds the share over the rest of
the life of the issuing firm. This approach to share price accuracy is functional
because the roles that share prices can play in the functioning of the real
economy relate to their capacity to signal which finns' proposed new real
investment projects promise the highest returns and which firms' managers are
doing a good job at operating existing facilities. The better share prices can
predict future firm cash flows to shareholders, the better they can perform these
roles.
3. See, e.g., George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132 (1973); Merritt B. Fox, RetainingMandatory
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor Enpowermnent, 85 VA. L. REV. 1334, 1369-95 (1999)
[hereinafter Retaining MandatoryDisclosure].
4. See infra Part Ill.

Measuring Share Price Accuracy
A. PreciseDefinitions of "Actual Value" and "Share PriceAccuracy"
The first step in understanding share price accuracy is to define a share's
"actual value," which at any point in time is the aggregate future stream of
income-dividends and other distributions-paid out from then on to whoever
holds the share over the lifetime of the firm (discounted to present value). This
definition of actual value requires an ex post view to be operative. The actual
value of a share at to, a point during the ongoing life of the firm, cannot be
determined until the moment of the firm's liquidation, tliq. The moment of
liquidation is the end of the firm's life, by which time the issuer has paid out its
last distribution. Only then can it be determined definitively how close the
share price at to was to the share's actual value. Until tliq, the amounts, if any, of
the remaining distribution or distributions are uncertain. Thus, at to, which is
prior to tliq, even the best-informed real-world investor can only make an
estimate of the share's actual value.
What can one say about the relationship at to between the market price of a
publicly traded share and its actual value? The efficient market hypothesis
(EMH) suggests that the market price of a share at to is an unbiased estimate of
the share's actual value at to. In other words, as best anyone can tell who
knows all information publicly available at the time, the price at to is,
ultimately, equally likely to turn out to be below the share's actual value at to as
above it. By itself, however, the conclusion that a share price is unbiased says
nothing about how close the price is likely to be--one way or the other-to
actual value. Share price is relatively "accurate" if it is likely to be relatively
close, whether above or below, to the share's actual value. When a price has a
high expected accuracy, the deviation of the price from actual value is on
6
average relatively small.

5. There is a large body of financial economics literature evaluating the market reaction to the
affirmative public announcement of various kinds of events affecting particular issuers. For a classic
review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). An event study involves a large
number of issuers, each of which has experienced at one point of time or another the announcement of a
particular kind of event, for example a stock split. The typical study shows that the shares of the affected
firms as a group experience statistically significant abnormal returns at the time of the announcement
and, starting almost immediately thereafter, normal returns for the duration of the study, which is
sometimes as long as several years. Thus, while some issuers' share prices go up in the periods
following the immediate reaction to the announcement and others go down (each compared to the
market as a whole), the average change is near zero. Assuming that longer term prices are themselves
unbiased measures of actual value, the results of the studies are thus consistent with the concept that the
market's evaluation of the significance of the event for the actual value of each issuer's shares, while it
may have sometimes have been too high and sometimes too low, was unbiased.
6. Put in statistical terms, price can be considered a random variable generated by a distribution
function that, because price is unbiased, has a mean equal to the share's actual value and a variance that
can be considered a measure of the expected accuracy of the price. Throughout this Article, when I refer
to price accuracy, I am referring to this concept of expected price accuracy.
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B. The Core Determinants of Share PriceAccuracy: The Existence of
Information and Its Reflection in Price
Share price accuracy is a function of two core determinants. One is the
amount of information concerning a firm's future distributions that exists in the
hands of one or more persons in the world relative to what would need to be
known to predict these distributions with perfect accuracy. The other is the
extent to which price reflects this information. A number of considerations
influence these two core determinants of share price accuracy.
1. Length of Time before Distributions
Consider first a firm that makes no distributions to its shareholders prior to
its liquidation. The closer in time an issuer is to its liquidation, the more
accurate, everything else being equal, is its share price. This proposition
becomes obvious by looking at an issuer's share price when the issuer is taking
its last breaths immediately prior to liquidation (i.e., when to is at a moment
immediately prior to tiiq). The market price is likely to be very close to the
amount of the liquidating distribution paid to the holder of each of its shares,
whether zero or some positive amount. This is because of the way both
determinants of share price accuracy work at this point. As for the amount of
information, it is relatively easy for at least some people to be highly informed
concerning the size of the final distribution. This information is then very likely
to become fully, or nearly fully, reflected in price, either through public
disclosure of what the liquidating distribution will be or, unless prevented by
effective rules imposed by the legal system or norm structure applicable to the
holders of the information, through trading by insiders or others informed via
tipping or selective disclosure.7
Now consider a company that makes one or more distributions prior to its
final liquidating distribution, for example in the form of a dividend. Each
distribution can be viewed as a partial liquidation of the firm. At any point in
time, the discounted present value of each distribution contributes its portion to
the total actual value of a share of the firm. In accord with the foregoing
analysis, the closer that point in time is to the time of any given distribution, the
more accurate is the portion of the market price that corresponds to the portion
of actual value relating to this distribution. The same is true for each other
distribution of the firm, including its final liquidating distribution, if any. Thus,
with multiple distributions, the conclusion continues to hold that the closer in
time to a firm's moment of liquidation, the more accurate is the price. Another
7. Because the information provides a near certain prediction of the amount of the distribution, the
economic risk associated with trading on the information is very low. Absent effective legal or

normative restraints on such trading, the volume of trades by insiders, tipees and selective disclosure
recipients is therefore likely to be high.
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implication of this analysis is that a firm that has a policy of paying out a larger
portion of its earnings in dividends is likely, ceteris paribus, to have a more
accurate share price.
2. Economic andLegal Incentives to Gather, Share, and Trade on
Information and Their Interaction
When a possible cash distribution by an issuer to its shareholders is
further in the future, share price accuracy is affected by the fact that, inherently,
it becomes increasingly difficult for persons to gather and analyze information
about the factors determining the amount of the distribution. How much
information is in fact gathered and analyzed by anyone depends on the
economic incentives to do so. It also depends on laws, to the extent they exist,
that effectively require such collection and analysis (such as a rule requiring a
public company to undergo an audit by an independent accountant). The extent
to which such information is then reflected in price depends on the economic
and legal incentives, both positive and negative, for persons who have gathered
and analyzed such information to disclose it to others (publicly or selectively).
It also depends on the economic and legal incentives, both positive and
negative, of anyone possessing such information-whether a generator or a
receiver-to trade on it.
Assessing the effect of existing economic and legal incentives on price
accuracy is made more complex by the fact that there is an interaction between
the considerations determining how much information is gathered and
analyzed, and the considerations determining how much of what is gathered
and analyzed gets reflected in price. On one hand, the opportunity to trade on
information that is not required to be disclosed to others creates incentives to
gather and analyze such information. On the other hand, the more widely held
information is by persons who can trade on it, the more likely it is to be
reflected in price. 8 Moreover, when someone receives, whether by selective or
8. See Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 568-69 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55

(1965) (describing how information is incorporated into price). The simplest models of price formation
suggest that price is the product of the weighted average of expectations of all investors. See, e.g., John
Lintner, The Aggregation of Investors' Diverse Judgments and Preferences in a Purely Competitive
Economy, 4 J. FIN. & QUANTIVE ANALYSIS 347. This would mean that the trading of a small number of
arbitrageurs acting on a piece of information could not by itself move price sufficiently to reflect fully
the import of the piece. Indeed, contrary to the EMH, in such a model, the price would not fully reflect
the information until all active investors knew the information. See Merritt B. Fox, Finance and
Industrial Performance, in A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 36-43 (Eli Noam
ed., 1987) [hereinafter Industrial Performance] (demonstrating the inadequacy of arbitrage to correct

prices fully due to the risk that arbitrage adds to an arbitrageur's portfolio because of the
dediversification it involves). More sophisticated models recognize that investors are aware that price
may reflect information known by other investors. Hence, price is not just a constraint, it can affect
investor demand for securities and as a result information known by only some traders can influence
price as if more investors knew it. Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets
Where Investors Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976). This is not a complete substitute for
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public disclosure, information gathered by someone else, the recipient may find
it more worthwhile herself to gather and analyze yet additional information on
her own. This is because the information that is received may constitute a
valuable input to the process of further discovery. Thus, for example, it may be
more worthwhile for an investor to gather and analyze information (not yet
gathered and analyzed by others) concerning the market for the product of an
issuer that has disclosed basic financial information about itself, than to gather
and analyze information concerning the market for the product of a firm that
has not engaged in such disclosure. 9 In addition, when a small number of
people are able to trade regularly on relatively precise material information in
advance of others, it becomes less profitable for persons outside that circle to
gather and analyze information for trading purposes.' 0 The complexities of
these interactions is what makes it difficult to determine at a theoretical level
whether share price accuracy is enhanced or diminished by any of the standard
tools of securities regulation, such as: mandatory disclosure, insider trading
regulation, the regulation of selective disclosure, broker-dealer regulation, or
regulation of analysts.

broader distribution of the information, however, because of the existence of noise (and other things
affecting price). As a result of noise and these other factors, investors not possessing information known
by others cannot "decode" share price effectively enough to be in the same position as if they knew the
information themselves. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
InformationallyEfficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
9. There are good theoretical reasons for thinking this to be tre. The discovery of information not
yet discovered by others and hence not reflected in market price is more likely to hold the promise of
greater arbitrage profits in the case of a firm that has disclosed basic financial information about itself
than in one that has not. The firm that has not disclosed the basic financial information is likely to have,
for the relevant time period, more risk associated with it than would the firm that has disclosed this
information. The risk is firm specific, though, and so it will not affect the riskiness of a fully diversified
portfolio. Each purchase, based on the difference between current price and what is indicated by the
newly discovered information, is an inherently dediverisfying transaction, however. Taking on an
additional share of the firm that has not disclosed will add more to the riskiness of the investor's
portfolio than taking on an additional share of the issuer that has disclosed. Thus, compared to the firm
that has disclosed, fewer shares of the firm that has not disclosed will be added to the investor's
portfolio before the additional arbitrage gain from purchasing an additional share is not worth the added
risk. See Industrial Performance,supra note 8, at 36-43. This prospect of smaller arbitrage profits will
reduce the incentive to gather and analyze information about the firm that does not disclose. More
generally, John Coffee has made the argument that mandatory disclosure constitutes a subsidy to the
investment analyst industry that increases that amount of analyst activity. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatorv Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728-29
(1984). Coffee's point is consistent with the theoretical point by Grossman and Stiglitz that if the cost of
gathering and analyzing private information is lower (which it would be with more free publicly
available information to use as feedstock for research) there will be a higher intensity of trading by the
smart money speculators, which will lead to "more informative pricing." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra
note 8, at 405. There is some empirical support for the theory that more disclosure leads to more
gathering and analysis of yet additional information. Lang and Lundholm find that a firm that discloses
more is followed by more analysts and that the analysts' forecasts are more accurate. Mark Lang &
Russell Lundholm, Cross Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosure, 31 J.
ACc'r. RES. 246 (1993).
10. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices,
23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading,
Markets, and "Negative" PropertyRights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1238-43 (2001).
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C. "SpeculativeNoise" versus "FundamentalInformation"
Share price accuracy will be diminished if the price is affected by what
financial economists refer to as speculative noise. The model of share pricing
described so far excludes speculative noise. It assumes that whatever
information share prices do reflect, it is of a kind that will help in predicting
future distributions more precisely (i.e., it is "fundamental information"). Thus,
the model implicitly assumes that smart money speculators focus exclusively
on future distributions and that their arbitrage activities fully counteract any
trading by naive speculators, whose trading is activated by fads, fashions, or
irrational psychological predispositions toward behaviors such as chasing
trends. Many financial economists believe, however, that the arbitrage activities
of the smart money speculators, even if they focus exclusively on future
distributions, do not always fully counteract the actions of these naive
speculators. As a result, share prices will be further from actual value than they
would have been absent the trading by the naive speculators, the difference
being speculative noise) The more speculative noise in the market, the less
accurate are share prices.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that, at least in some part, if less
fundamental information is gathered and reflected in share price, the smart
money speculators will not focus exclusively on future distributions and their
attention will turn in part to the direction of speculative noise. If, relative to
fundamental information, this noise plays a larger role in determining future

11. See, e.g., Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). In the view of these economists,
speculative noise can occur even if there are smart money speculators in the market who trade knowing
a stock's fundamental value (the price that would prevail if the market consisted entirely of rational
investors who possessed all available information-i.e., the price that would prevail in a truly efficient
market). The smart money speculators are limited in their ability to arbitrage away the difference
between what the share's market price would be, based on the trades of the noise traders and the share's
fundamental value. To start, unless the smart money speculators have an infinite time horizon, the
uncertainty created by the possibility of continued noise trading makes taking such a position inherently
risky even if the smart money speculators know for certain a stock's actual value. This is because they
know at the time they are contemplating a purchase that because of noise, price at the end of their time
horizon may still deviate from actual value. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in
Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990). Furthermore, smart money speculators in fact do not
know a stock's actual value with certainty; rather, they only know its fundamental value, which is the
value implied by the available fundamental information. Thus, fundamental value is just a more accurate
guess concerning actual value than is the noise trade influenced market price. This uncertainty as to the
stock's actual value adds to the smart money speculators' risk of arbitrage. See Andrei Schliefer &
Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 19 (1990);
Industrial Performance, supra note 8, at 36-43, 55-59. It should also be noted that the very fact that
gathering and analyzing information privately is costly means that despite the existence of smart money
speculative traders, space exists for noise trading to occur. This is because of the "efficient market
paradox" noted by Grossman and Stiglitz, who observe that "because [acquiring private) information is
costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is available, since if it did, those who spent
resources to obtain it would receive no compensation." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 8, at 405. An
excellent survey in the legal literature of the work of the noise theorists, together with an analysis of its
legal implications, is found in Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
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share prices, speculators will get more reward for trying to figure out future
noise and less reward for trying to figure out future cash distributions to
shareholders. 12 This reward structure makes the effort to design social
institutions that encourage the gathering and analyzing of fundamental
information and its reflection in price doubly important in terms of share price
accuracy. It thus makes more critical the determination of the effectiveness of
mandatory disclosure, for example.
II. SHARE PRICE INFORMEDNESS
A. The Concept
Share price informedness is a concept closely related to share price
accuracy. A share price is more informed at a given time if it reflects a larger
portion of all the fundamental information known, or, through sufficient effort,
knowable, by one or more persons in the world. Thus, a fully informed price
would reflect all information that is knowable at the time. Any fact that is at a
given time unknowable will by definition have an unpredictable (i.e., random)
effect on future shareholder distributions. Because of this, a fully informed
price, while not perfectly accurate, would be both unbiased and the most
accurate price possible at the time. Therefore, all of the factors discussed above
that make a share price more accurate make it more informed as well.
Share price accuracy and informedness can be pictured as follows. Consider
an analogy between the process by which bits of information are incorporated
into share price and sampling from a large urn containing 1000 balls. Assume
that somewhere between zero and 1000 of the balls are red and the rest are
green. Prior to any sampling of the urn, nothing is known about the ratio of red
to green balls in the urn. A share's actual value is analogous to the actual ratio
of the green to red balls. A random sample of the urn's balls is equivalent to the
bits of information that are incorporated in price. Even a small sample of balls
provides an unbiased estimate of the actual ratio of red to green balls.
Similarly, in an efficient market, share price is an unbiased estimate of a
share's actual value even if there is not a great deal of information available.
The impact on the estimate of drawing another ball from the urn is
unknowable-it could increase or decrease the estimate of the actual ratio-but
the more balls that are drawn from the urn (i.e., the larger the sample)-the
greater the expected accuracy of the estimate. Similarly, the impact of a new bit

12.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY

157 (1936). Grossman and Stiglitz make the inverse of this point, suggesting that if the cost of gathering
and analyzing private information is lower, there will be a higher intensity of trading by the smart
money speculators, which will lead to "more informative pricing." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 8,at
404.
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of information on share price is unknowable prior to its availability-it could
increase or decrease price-but its incorporation in price will increase the
price's expected accuracy as an estimate of the share's actual value. The ratio
of green to red balls in the largest sample possible at any point in time will
provide the most accurate possible estimate of the actual ratio in the urn.
Similarly, a fully informed price at a given point in time is the most accurate
estimate possible at that time of the actual value of the share.
While the concept of share price accuracy allows a simpler, more direct
story concerning the relationship between share prices and the real economy,
the concept of share price informedness serves two useful functions in fully
understanding this relationship. First, it avoids the discomfort that some may
feel about the deterministic nature of the model behind the concept of share
price accuracy. More importantly, as will become clear when I discuss
immediately below the use of the R 2 methodology to measure share price
accuracy, the concept of price informedness highlights the fact that price
movement can be a sign of share price accuracy rather than inaccuracy. This is
because price movement may indicate, at least in part, an ongoing process by
which new fundamental information is being reflected in price.
B. Relationship of Share PriceAccuracy to Price Movement
In essence, there are two countervailing considerations at work in terms of
the relationship between price accuracy and price movement. The first force
relates to the expectation discussed above that the deviation between the
portion of an issuer's share's actual value derived from the discounted present
value of any given expected future distribution, and the corresponding portion
of the share's price, will tend to decrease as the length of time before the
distribution decreases.' 3 Taking account of just this first consideration, at any
given point in time, the more accurate the price is, the less share price
movement one would expect to see thereafter as price eventually approaches
actual value. Thus, if only this consideration were at work, where one observes
over a period of time relatively little movement in the price of an issuer's
shares, one would assume that on average its share price was more accurate
than the share price of an issuer displaying more movement.
The second consideration is the amount of new information relevant to an
issuer's future cash distributions that on an ongoing basis is being gathered,
analyzed, and reflected in price. This second consideration can potentially work
in the other direction. Just taking account of the second consideration, more
movement may suggest greater accuracy. Consider firms A and B. Assume that
A and B will each make a single distribution of the same amount, at liquidation,
on the same date sometime in the future. Thus, at any point in time, the shares
13.

See supra Part I.B. I.
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of the two firms have the same actual value. To control for the first
consideration, assume that at the beginning of the period of observation, A's
and B's prices are equally distant from the respective shares' actual values.
After this, substantial amounts of new information about firm A is, on an
ongoing basis, being gathered, analyzed and reflected in its share price. Less of
this updating is occurring with respect to B.
Each newly arriving bit of information will on average move price closer to
actual value but will, as appears to be the case in the real world, include a
significant amount of random noise. The random noise I refer to here is not the
speculative noise discussed earlier. 14 It simply reflects the idea that any new
piece of information is not perfect. While, on an expected basis, each bit of
information moves price toward actual value, it contains a random element that
in any given case may move price in the opposite direction. In terms of the
analogy above comparing the incorporation of information into securities prices
with sampling from an urn containing 1000 red and green balls in an
undetermined proportion, the new bit of information is like a collection of balls,
some of which are from the urn and the rest of which are randomly added from
a side collection that is half red balls and half green balls. The person doing the
sampling knows the average number of balls drawn from the side collection but
no more. Each sample adds to the accuracy of the estimate of the ratio of red to
green balls in the urn despite the noise from the balls drawn from the side
collection.
Information bit by information bit, price may move one way or the other,
but the total effect of the cumulating bits will on average be moving price
closer and closer toward actual value. 15 One would expect firm A to have,
during the period of observation, a more informed, and hence more accurate,
price than firm B because the updating information is on average moving its
share price closer to actual value. If the random noise element of each bit is
sufficiently large, however, A's share price will display more price movement
on average than B's, given that new bits of information arrive more frequently
and with the arrival of each bit comes random noise that can shift price.
Consider the following example to demonstrate the plausibility of the
proposition that firm A, whose price is more frequently updated by new
information than that of firm B, will have on average a more accurate price, but
will have price changes displaying a greater variance than will firm B's price
changes. Suppose that firms A and B will each pay out a single shareholder
distribution, which will occur at liquidation. Each will liquidate at t5 , and will
14. See supra Part I.C.
15. This model, in which new information, on the one hand, helps to bring price toward actual
value but, on the other hand, is less than perfect, follows in the tradition of R.W. Holthausen & R.E.
Verrecchia, The Effect of Sequential Information Releases on the Variance of Price Changes in an
Interiemporal Multi-Asset Market, 26 J. ACCT. REs. 82 (1988); and K.R. Subramanyam, Uncertain
PrecisionandPriceReactions to Information, 71 ACCT. REv. 207 (1996).
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pay out $10 per share at that time, its only shareholder distribution. Assuming
for simplicity a zero discount rate (i.e., pricing is in accordance with CAPM
and there is no time value of money or systematic risk), each firm's shares will
have an actual value of $10 throughout the life of the firm. Suppose also that at
to each firm has a price of $15 and so each starts out with an equally inaccurate
price.
Firm A's price is updated in each of the five periods by a new bit of
information. The bit of new information in each of periods ti, t 2, t 3 , and t4
contains two elements. One element is like an accurate missing piece in the
puzzle and moves the price $1 closer toward actual value. The other element is
noise: it is random and has an expected value of zero. Investors can only
observe the aggregate implications of the two elements combined. Thus, on an
expected basis, A's price becomes more accurate after the receipt of each bit of
information, but the observable aggregate implication of the bit involves
variation around what would be implied by the accurate-piece-of-the-puzzle
element alone. The bit of new information at t5 is the announcement of the
liquidating distribution. The price at t5 is therefore $10 and is perfectly
accurate. Firm B's price is not updated at all until ts, but, for it too, the bit of
information at t 5 is the announcement of the liquidating distribution. Its price at
t 5 is therefore also a perfectly accurate $10.
The following prices provide an example consistent with this story. Firm A
has a price at to of $15. At tj, the price is $12.50 (the result of a noise element
of -$1.50, which when combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture
element, moves the price in aggregate down by 2.50). At t 2 , the price is $14.50
(the result of a noise element of +$3.00, which when combined with the
accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate up by
$2.00). At t 3 , the price is $10.50 (the result of a noise element of -$3.00, which
when combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price
in aggregate down by $4.00). At t4, the price is $11.00 (the result of a noise
element of +$1.50, which when combined with accurate piece of the picture
element, moves the price in aggregate up by $.50). At t5 , the price equals the
share's actual value of $10 (the result of the noiseless announcement of the
liquidating distribution, providing the last missing piece of the picture). Thus
the noise element in this example has a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of 2.37. Firm B's price stays at $15 for periods ti, t 2, t 3 , and t 4 and drops to $10
in period t 5 , when the liquidating dividend is announced. The paths of the share
prices of A and B are depicted in Figures 1 and 2 below.
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As shown in Table I below, firm A's price changes display a greater
variance than firm B's (5.5 versus 5.0) even though firm A's share price is on
average closer to its actual value of $10 (i.e., more accurate) than firm B's
share price. This greater accuracy can be observed simply from looking at
Figures 1 and 2. A more precise measure of average share price accuracy would
be the average of the squared deviations of share price from actual value in
periods tI, t2 , t 3 , t4, and t 5 (the smaller the figure, the more accurate the price).
As shown in Table I below, the average of these squared deviations for firm A
is 5.55 and for firm B is 20.
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TABLE I

Firm A
(1)

(3)

(2)

Accurate
-Piece-ofthePuzzle
Element

Random
Noise
Element

(4)

Total
Effect

Price

(5)

(6)

Square of
Price
Change

Square of
Deviation of
Price from
Actual Value
of $10

15.00

to
t,-1

-1.5

-2.5

12.50

6.25

6.250

t2

+3.0

+2.0

14.50

4.00

20.25

t3

-1

-3.0

-4.0

10.50

16.0

0.250

t4

-1

+1.5

+5.0

11.00

0.25

1.000

t5

-1

0

-1.0

10.00

1.00

0

Total

-5

0

-5.0

27.5

27.75

5.50

5.550

Variance or Average Square of Deviation

Firm B
Accurate
-Piece-ofthePuzzle
Element

(4)

(3)

(2)

(1)

Random
Noise
Element

Total
Effect

Price

(5)

(6)

Square of
Price
Change

Square of
Deviation of
Price from
Actual Value
of $10

15.00

to
]

0

0

15.00

0

25

t2

0

0

15.00

0

25

h

0

0

15.00

0

25

t4

0

0

15.00

0

25

ts

-5

0

-5.0

10.00

25

0

Total

-5

0

-5.0

25

100

5.0

20

Variance or Average Square of Deviation
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This example is generalizable to ongoing firms not facing immediate
liquidation. Specifically, the result that firm A will have on average a more
accurate share price and will display a higher price variance is replicable under
the following changed assumptions. Imagine a five-period cycle in which, once
every fifth time period, the prices of firm A and B are equally accurate. Firm A
is updated every period. Firm B is updated only every fifth period, but with a
bigger piece of information so that, after the updating, its price is for the
moment as accurate as firm A's. The example above now illustrates one such
cycle with each firm starting at an equally accurate $15 at to and each ending up
at an equally more accurate $10 in t 5, but with firm A making adjustments
along the way. The same calculations as in the example above show that in this
case also firm A has on average greater share price accuracy and greater price
variance.
I am not claiming that more frequent updating inevitably results in the
combination of greater share price variance and greater share price accuracy.
Whether or not it does depends on the amount of noise in the updating bits of
information. The example only illustrates that greater share price accuracy can
plausibly be accompanied by greater share price variance. There are other
possibilities as well. If the random noise element is sufficiently small, firm A,
compared to firm B, could have a combination of smaller price variance and
greater share price accuracy. If the random noise element is sufficiently large,
firm A, compared to firm B, could have a combination of larger price variance
and less share price accuracy. Where the amount of random noise element to
new information is between these two extremes, however taking account ofjust
this second consideration-more frequent updating-, the more accurate the
share price is at a given time, the more share price movement one would expect
to see.
In the real world, both countervailing considerations are at work. The first
consideration, relating to time to liquidation, is working so that greater price
movement suggests less share price accuracy and the second is working so that,
at least if information bits contain an amount of noise in the middle range,
greater price movement suggests greater share price accuracy. One can say as a
theoretical matter that the second consideration would be more important
relative to the first in the case of relatively short term (e.g., day-to-day or weekto-week) price changes compared to longer term (quarter-to-quarter, year-toyear, or decade-to-decade) price changes, because with the longer term price
changes the noise elements of the day to day updates tend to cancel each other
out. For any given term's price changes, however, this observation does not tell
us which consideration predominates. Whether greater price movement
indicates greater or lesser price accuracy is ultimately an empirical question. I
will discuss immediately below strong empirical support for the conclusion
that, in the case of relatively short term price changes, more movement
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indicates greater share price accuracy.
This discussion of price informedness suggests that price variance over
time may not be a good inverse proxy for share price accuracy. As a theoretical
matter, greater variance may be associated with more share price accuracy
rather than less, especially if the time intervals are short between the points at
which the price changes are measured.
lII. THE R' METHODOLOGY

A new measure for the informedness of share prices and hence their
accuracy involves a measure, R 2 , which is related to the extent to which share
prices of an economy's issuers move together.' 6 For the reasons discussed
below, R 2 appears to be a better inverse proxy than share price variance for
how much fundamental information concerning future shareholder distributions
is impounded in share prices: the lower is R2, the more accurate are prices.
A. Preliminary TheoreticalConsiderations
There are good preliminary theoretical reasons for believing that higher comovement of stocks in an economy indicates less informed prices of the shares
of individual firms. These reasons follow from an explanation offered by Laura
Veldkamp concerning why share prices appear as a general matter to co-vary7
more than would be called for by measures of their fundamental value.'
Veldcamp suggests this pattern results from the facts that information is costly
and that information about the future distributions of one issuer has some
predictive value concerning the future distributions of other issuers as well. As
a result, investors may economize in their expenditures for acquisition of
information. They may collect information about one issuer and also use it to
predict the future distributions of other issuers even where they could make
better predictions about the future distributions of the others if the collected
information specifically about each of these other issues as well. The price of
the shares of the other issuers would therefore co-vary with that of the issuer
about which the information is collected more than would be called for by their
respective fundamentals. In a richer information environment where collecting
information about each individual issuer is less expensive, less of this reliance
16. The R' measure for an individual country is computed as follows. For each individual issuer j in
the country, run a regression using time-series data on the issuer's share rate of return whereby
rj,, = 0j, + Pimr., + j ri,, + e ,, with r. = market return and ri = industry return. Then decompose the total

variance of the issuer's return as follows:

or' = a'2 + c.2

R2 for firm j is then defined as

2
R 2 =ca2/(a2 ta 2). R for the country is an average of the R's for its individual issuers, weighted by
the total variation of each stock's return. From this formula, one can see that there is more firm-specific
variation when R2 is low.R 2 is low.
17. Laura L. Veldkamp, Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices (2003)
(working paper, on file with author).
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on information about one issuer to predict the future returns of another would
occur and the amount of co-variance would be lower. In such a world,
individual share prices would be more accurate. Thus lower co-variance would
be an indicator of greater share price accuracy.
B. Indirect Evidence That R 2 Is a Good Inverse Proxyfor Share Price Accuracy
The idea that R2 is a good inverse proxy for share price accuracy initially
arose from the observation by Morck, Yeung, and Yu ("MYY") that countries
vary a great deal in the extent to which share prices of their firms tend to move
together, the phenomenon measured by R2.' 8 This difference among countries
is shown dramatically in Figure 3, on the next page. For example, for most
weeks during the first half of 1995, in each of China, Malaysia, and Poland,
over 80 percent of stocks moved in the same direction; for the same period in
each of Denmark, Ireland, and the United States, there was not a single week in
which as many as 58 percent of firms moved in the same direction (despite, in
the case of the United States, the then-ongoing bull market). 19 These startling
differences cry out for explanation.
1. The Link between R2, Poor Quality Government, andRisk Arbitrage
MYY try to explain these national differences by exploring the factors that
seem to be associated with low and high R2 scores. They observe, as illustrated
in Figure 3, that developed countries, ones with high per-capita GDP, tend to
have low R2s and emerging countries, ones with low per-capita GDP, tend to
have high R2s. There is no obvious reason why low per-capita GDP would lead
directly to a greater tendency for share prices to move together. More likely,
MYY reason, low per-capita GDP is associated with other national
characteristics that lead to this result. 2° MYY try to identify what these other
characteristics might be and in the process find evidence that R 2 is a good
inverse proxy of how much fundamental information is impounded in share
prices.
MYY first consider a number of obvious structural characteristics of a
country that a priori would appear likely to affect its R. 2 1 One factor is country
size. Firms in a small country might be more uniformly subject to
environmental influences such as bad weather or nearby geopolitical instability.
Small countries also tend to have more uniform factor endowments, making

18. Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets

Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 217-19 (2000) [hereinafter
Information Content].

19. Id. Data from other periods in the 1990s behave similarly. Id
20. Id. at 227-28.
21.

Id.at230-41.
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their overall economies more sensitive to changes in relative factor prices such
as the price of oil. A second structural characteristic is the extent of diversity of
a country's firms across industries: the less the diverse the industries, the more
likely the fortunes of all firms will move together. A third structural
characteristic, which serves as a kind of catchall, is the extent to which the
earnings of a country's firms tend to move together.
Figure 3
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MYY run a regression with a log transformation of country R2s as the
dependent variable (the variable to be explained) and with per-capita GDP and
measures of each of these three structural characteristics as the independent
variables (the variables that potentially explain the dependent variable). The
coefficient for per-capita GDP remains statistically significant. Continuing with
the proposition that there is no reason why low per-capita GDP would lead
directly to share prices moving together, the continued significance of the percapita GDP coefficient suggests it is a proxy for yet additional country
characteristics, institutional rather than structural, that help explain the
2
variation in R2 across
countries. 22 MYY add to the regression one additional
independent variable, a measure for "good government," This measure consists
23
of the sum of the scores for each country on indexes created by La Porta et a1
relating to government corruption, risk of government expropriation, and risk
of governmental contract repudiation. With the addition of this factor, the
coefficient for per-capita GDP becomes insignificant. In sum, countries vary in
their R2 s not just because of differences in their structural characteristics, such
as country size and diversity of industry. An institutional factor-the quality of
government-appears to play an important role as well.
MYY's discovery that governmental quality plays an important role in
explaining differences among countries in their R2s leads them to hypothesize
2
24
that R2 might be a good inverse proxy for price informedness. I believe this is
a plausible hypothesis. My reasoning, building upon MYY, begins with the
observation that the predictability of future cash distributions to a firm's
outside shareholders depends on two factors. One is the predictability of the
level of the firm's underlying cash flows. The second is the predictability of the
division of these underlying cash flows between the outside shareholders, on
one hand, and inside shareholders and other firm stakeholders, on the other.
In countries with low good government scores, extra-legal governmental
influence will play a larger role in determining both the level of firm cash flows
and the division of these cash flows. In low good-government-score countries,
a firm's profitability can be dramatically affected by whether or not it has close
relationships with governmental officials, the persons who grant government
contracts, issue licenses, and determine when to enforce regulations. Also in
such countries, the division of a firm's cash flows will deviate from the
standard corporate law model of pro-rata distribution among all shareholders.
Instead, inside shareholders receive, in one form or another, more than a prorata share of the wealth generated by a firm's activities, and other stakeholders
receive more than a market return for their contributions to the firm. 25 These
22. Id. at 241-51.
23.

Raphael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcoN. 1112 (1998)

24. Morck et al., Information Content, supra note 18, at 242-43.
25. Russia provides an excellent case study of this problem. See Bernard Black et al., Russian
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deviations come at the expense of outside shareholders. The closer a firm's
inside shareholders and other stakeholders are to governmental officials, the
greater are the governmental tolerance of such deviations.
This larger extra-legal governmental influence on the amount of
distributions ultimately reaching outside shareholders makes these distributions
harder to predict. To start, in low score countries, the cash flow levels of firms
themselves are harder to predict. This is because the impact of this extra-legal
governmental influence on cash flows from one firm to the next is harder to
predict than the purely market factors that would determine firm cash flows in
the absence of such influence. The problem of predicting the impact of such
influence on the cash flows of any one particular firm is aggravated by the
opaque, erratic nature of political regimes prevalent in many emerging
countries.2 6 In addition, the proportion of this cash flow that will ultimately be
paid out to outside shareholders of a firm in a low score country is itself less
predictable. In such a country, outside shareholders are, as noted, relatively
unprotected legally. The total amount of distributions that they receive over the
life of the firm is arbitrary. Outsiders receive what is left over, if anything, after
the inside shareholders and other stakeholders have taken what their positions
of political power allow them to get, plus, perhaps, the occasional distribution
to outsiders made for some strategic reason.
The last step in our reasoning concerns the effect of these less predictable
distributions to outside shareholders on the process of share pricing. When
future distributions to outside shareholders are harder to predict, naYve
speculators-the "noise traders"-are more likely to become confused, which
adds to the riskiness undertaken by rational smart money speculators-the risk
arbitrageurs-who bet against them.27 This added riskiness makes it less
attractive to be a risk arbitrageur, which means less such activity occurs in the
economy. Less information about fundamentals (both firm specific and market
wide) is incorporated in price because fewer risk arbitraguers find it worthwhile
to gather, analyze, and act on such information. As a result, there is more effect
on price from the trading of the naive speculators ("noise trading") and share
prices will less accurately reflect what the distributions to outside shareholders
ultimately turn out to be. 28 This problem of a low level of risk arbitrage in
countries with low good government measures may be accentuated by the fact
Privatizationand Corporate Governance, What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000); Merritt
B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1740-45, 1762-71 (2000).
26. Morck et al., Information Content supra note 18, at 242-44. The idea that there will be more
noise trading when future distributions to outside shareholders are less predictable is consistent with the
idea that when less information is publicly available, less trading based on privately acquired and
analyzed information will occur. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
27. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise TraderRisk in FinancialMarkets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 733.
See also supra Part L.C.
28. Morck et al., Information Content, supra note 18, at 244-47.
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that in such countries, risk arbitraguers may be less confident that they will be
able to keep free from confiscation of the profits that they do manage to
make. 29 This lower level of risk arbitrage, with its resulting lower level of price
informedness and hence price accuracy and higher level of noise trading, can
be expected to be accompanied by the higher R s that one observes with the
low good government score countries. This is because the fads and fashions
that motivate naive speculative traders tend to have an impact across the
market.
In sum, the link between high R2s and low price informedness is established
as follows. High R s are observed to be associated with low good government
scores. Low good government scores suggest that extra-legal governmental
influence will play a larger role in determining future distributions to outside
shareholders. The impact of this kind of influence is harder to predict than the
market forces that would otherwise determine the level of such distributions,
thereby making the distributions themselves less predictable. This
unpredictability confuses naive speculative traders, which causes them to act in
ways that add to the risk of smart money speculation. This added risk depresses
the level of risk arbitrage activity, which has two consequences. One is that less
information is impounded in prices. The other is that the naive speculative
traders have a larger role in setting prices. The fads and fashions that motivate
the naive speculative traders tend to have impact across the market, and hence
their larger role in the market results in prices of different firms tending to
move together more. As a consequence, country R will be higher. Thus,
everything else being equal, a high R2 is indicative of a low level of risk
arbitrage, which will result in a low level of price informedness.
2. FurtherImplications of the Link between R 2 and Poor Quality
Government
The implications for share price informedness of our analysis go even
deeper than this, however. While the mechanisms of real economic efficiency
promoted by share price accuracy still work to some extent even when prices
are relatively less accurate, the greater extra-legal governmental influence that
drives up R2 not only leads to a lower level of share price accuracy, it makes
this lower level of price accuracy even less effective than it would otherwise be
in promoting the functioning of these mechanisms of real economic efficiency.
To see why, recall that a share price is less accurate when it is less likely to be
close to the share's actual value, which is the discounted present value of what
the future distributions to outside shareholders ultimately turn out to be. In low
good government score countries, a significant factor in this lower level of
share price accuracy is the underlying unpredictability concerning the
29. Id. at 243.
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proportion of a firm's underlying overall cash flow that will ultimately reach
outside shareholders. Thus, share price is doubly less informed in terms of
being an estimate of the firm's underlying overall cash flows. This result is
critical because the theory suggesting that accurate share prices enhance real
economic efficiency assumes that accurate share prices are good estimates of
future underlying overall firm cash flow. 30 A firm's residuals are, under in this
theory, assumed reliably to go largely to its shareholders and every shareholder,
whether inside or outside, is assumed to receive a pro-rata distribution of these
residuals. In short, share prices in a country with a low quality government are
doubly disabled in their capacity to promote efficiency in the real economy.
First, because there is less risk arbitrage, share prices are poorer predictors of
future distributions to outside shareholders. Second, future distributions to
outside shareholders are themselves less reliable indicators of a firm's
underlying cash flow. It is the accuracy of prices as predictors of firm cash
flows that promotes the effectiveness of the mechanisms of efficiency in the
real economy.
3. OtherIndirect Evidence That R 2 Is a Good Inverse Proxyfor Price
Informedness
2
Two other pieces of indirect evidence help support the hypothesis that R is

2
an inverse proxy for price informedness. First, the average R for U.S. firms

has decreased significantly over the twentieth century, particularly since World
War I. 31 This corresponds to a period in which, for both technological and
institutional reasons, more information has become available for risk
arbitraguers to use, even putting aside mandatory disclosure, which was
originally adopted in the 1930s and has since been significantly enhanced.
Second, MYY examined a subsample consisting of R2s of all the developed
countries in their study. In the regressions they ran to try to explain the
differences in R 2s among these countries, they included, as an additional
independent variable, another La Porta et al.3 2 index, one purporting to measure
the protection of outside shareholders through rights that help them control
directors. They find that the coefficient for this index was negative and
statistically significant, thus suggesting an inverse relationship between the
level of such protections and country R2.
MYY's explanation for this result starts with the assumption that in a
country with weak protection for outside shareholders, managers will find it
easier to divert a larger portion of the firm's cash flow to themselves. These

30,
31.
32.
33.

See supra Part [.B.
Morck et al., Information Content, supra note 18, at 220-22.
La Porta et al., supra note 23.
Morck et al., Information Content,supra note 18, at 255.
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managers are more likely to divert extra cash flow generated by favorable firm
specific developments than extra cash flow generated by favorable
developments in the economy as a whole. This is because a diversion of the
firm-specific, development-generated income is less likely to be detected, since
outsiders know more about changes in economy-wide factors than about
changes in firm-specific factors. Thus, changes in firm cash flow due to
changes in economy-wide factors are more likely to be passed on to outside
shareholders. As a consequence, these changes in economy-wide factors are
likely to affect distributions to outside shareholders more than they affect the
underlying cash flow of the firm. The result will be the higher R2s that are
observed in the data for countries with a lower level of protection for outside
shareholders. This effect will be accentuated by the fact that, relative to
countries with more protection, risk arbitrageurs in low protection countries
will rationally devote more of their attention to predicting economy-wide
factors and less to predicting firm specific factors, because these economy-wide
34
factors play a larger role in determining distributions to outside shareholders.
In conclusion, while the higher R 2s in such countries do not necessarily indicate
that share prices are less accurate predictors of future distributions to outside
shareholders, they will be less accurate predictors of underlying firm cash flows
and thus again will35 not perform as well their real-economy, efficiencyenhancing functions.
C. Direct Test of R2 as a Proxyfor Share PriceAccuracy
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin ("DMYZ") examine more directly the
usefulness of R 2 as an inverse proxy for share price accuracy by examining the
relationship between a firm's R 2 and the extent to which its share price reflects
future versus current earnings. 36 For a set of U.S. publicly traded firms, DMYZ
go back in time and regress each firm's then current stock price on its then
current and future earnings. They find that future earnings explain more of the
share prices of low R 2 firms than with high R2 firms. In other words, share
prices of lower R2 firms are better predictors of their future earnings than share
prices of high R 2 firms.
This finding is much more direct evidence that low R 2 firms have more
accurate share prices. Remember that a more accurate share price is one that
better predicts future shareholder distributions. Future distributions can only
come from presently known existing assets or future cash flows, and future
earnings are on average a reasonably good proxy for future cash flows.

34. id. at 254.
35. See supra Part I.B.
36. Artyom Durnev et al., Does More Firm Specific Stock Price Variation Mean More of Less
Informed Pricing? (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with the author).
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CONCLUSION

Theory suggests that regulatory policies relating to a wide range of
activities-issuer disclosure, insider trading and tipping, selective disclosure to
institutions and analysts, and analyst recommendations-may possibly affect
share price accuracy. With respect to each of these activities, however, there is
heated debate concerning whether in fact the activity has such an effect and if
so in which direction. The widespread belief that the level of share price
accuracy affects the efficiency of the real economy suggests the importance of
resolving these debates. Assuming this belief is correct, it is obvious that
regulatory policy could be improved if there were more empirical evidence
addressing these questions.
This Article has addressed the problem of developing a practical empirical
measure of share price accuracy. It has argued that share price variance, the
traditional measure, is ambiguous in its actual implications. Under at least some
circumstances, greater share price movement indicates greater, not less, share
price accuracy. A new measure, R2, which reflects the extent to which a firm's
share price moves with the prices of all the other firms in the economy, appears
to be a more reliable proxy. While further testing is required, there are good
theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that a lower R 2 (i.e., less comovement) means a more accurate price.
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